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International Political Economy
International political economy (IPE) is a subset of
the discipline of International Relations that exam
ines political actors’ efforts to govern and shape in
ternational economic events. For instance, increased
trade interdependence in the international econ
omy tends to create winners (beneficiaries) and
losers (harmed groups) within nation states. Who
these groups are, and how different political actors,
ranging from voters to labor unions to business
groups to elected officials, try to govern the effects
of international trade concerns the study of interna
tional political economy. At the same time, actors
affect international economic relations by pursuing

their preferences regarding economic outcomes on
the international arena. For instance, the history of
the major global economic institutions created
for the post-Second World War world, including the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), demonstrates US leaders’ commit
ment to generate economic interdependence among
nations. In sum, IPE examines the “reciprocal and
dynamic interaction” between politics and econom
ics in international relations (Gilpin 1975).
A Snapshot of the Discipline. As a subdiscipline of
international relations, IPE is relatively young, dating
back only to the 1970s. In that decade, a number of
major international economic developments—such
as the 1973 oil crisis, the rise of the European and
Japanese economies, and the collapse of the Bretton
Woods fixed exchange rate system—directed
attention to the study of international economic
events, as distinct from international security. The
i970salsowitnessedtheglobalspreadofmultinational
corporations, which have not only acted as primary
agents of foreign direct investment but have also
changed the pattern of production by distributing
different parts of the production process of a good to
different countries. The major economic events of
the 1980s, such as the Latin American debt crisis,
bolstered the growth of IPE.
Given that globalization has become an increas
ingly relevant concept for understanding interna
tional relations, IPE has evolved to study the
determinants as well as the effects of globalization.
Globalization can be understood as the increasing
interdependence of different parts of the world
through the cross-border movement of goods, ser
vices, and capital, as well as the institutions that
generate and/or govern this independence, includ
ing international nonstate actors (ranging from
nongovernmental organizations to international
business) and international organizations (such as
the IMF). Globalization is not new, and scholars
debate whether the levels of interdependence in the
nineteenth century and up until the onset of the
First World War supersede the levels of interdepen
dence witnessed today. These debates aside, IPE
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increasingly focuses on examining the phenomenon
of globalization.
The diversity and divisions within IPE are worth
while to note. First, Benjamin Cohen (2008) has
argued that there is a British School of IPE and an
American School of IPE. The “American School,”
Cohen argues, is wedded to “positivism and empiri
cism,” which means the testing of hypotheses against
data is prioritized (p. 4). In contrast, the “British
School” focuses more on normative questions (p. 44).
Even if one disagrees with Cohen’s labeling of these
two schools of thought, which is not a geographical,
but rather a school-of-thought divide, his analysis
still highlights the different kinds of questions and
approaches found in IPE. Belatedly but distinctly,
there are methodological divisions in answering key
puzzles in IPE, the primary division being between
qualitative (such as case study methodology) and
quantitative approaches (such as regression analy
ses). Qualitative approaches need not be normatively driven—they can (and often do) have a
positivist approach underlying them. Still, the data
and the testing in qualitative analyses differ, by
definition, from quantitative analyses. Mixed ap
proaches combine both quantitative and qualitative
work. Also, even within each school of thought, such
as the American School of IPE, there are different
theoretical/analytical approaches.
Dominant Approaches, Key Issues. What follows
is a brief introduction to the main theoretical/
analytical paradigms that has dominated the
American school of IPE since its beginnings:
realism, liberalism, and constructivism. These three
approaches dominate the analytical frameworks
utilized in articles published in the top IPE journals
(Maliniak and Tierney, 2009). The broad charac
teristic of each approach is discussed at the expense
of nuances.
Realism. Realist approaches to IPE, by and large,
share the following attributes. First, they tend to be
state-centric in that states, and not nonstate actors
such as multinational corporations, are the primary
units of analysis. Most realist analyses tend to see
nonstate actors governed by state actions, an ex
ample being multinational corporations ultimately

being circumscribed by state regulation. Realist
accounts treat states as unitary actors. Second, the
role of power and the distribution of power among
states are paramount in explaining outcomes, with
power generally denoting capabilities. For instance,
these works might highlight how global regulatory
outcomes, such as the regulation of financial
markets, can be explained with reference to great
power preferences (Drezner, 2007). By virtue of these
two factors, third, realist analyses tend to be
“systemic” in that they focus on the interaction of
states and the outcomes produced by that
interaction. In this respect, the study of domestic
politics is, at best, secondary to the analysis of
strategic state interaction. Because it is emblematic
of these points, and because it has had a significant
impact on the field of IPE, a brief discussion of
hegemonic stability theory follows.
Hegemonic stability theory argues that periods of
hegemony (when there is a dominant power in the
international system) are associated within eco
nomic openness (such as to international trade) in
the international system, and that a hegemon is
necessary for such a system (Krasner, 1976). The he
gemon will prefer to open up to international trade,
as Krasner points out, because the potential benefits
(e.g., an increase in aggregate income) of it doing so
exceed the potential costs (e.g., potential destabiliz
ing from shifts in the national economy). The hege
mon can also induce others to enhance their
participation in international trade through the
provision of incentives and disincentives. For in
stance, the hegemon can use side payments, such as
increased foreign aid, to persuade other states to
(further) open their economies to trade. The hege
mon can also disincentivize the opposite behavior
by punishing those that protect their economies
from trade. Core to hegemonic stability theory is the
notion that different distributions of power lead to
different types of political-economic outcomes.
The importance of distribution of power is also
present in realist approaches to the study of interna
tional institutions. While some strands of realism do
not take institutions seriously, realism in general,
and realist works in IPE in particular, concede the
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importance of international institutions. Having
said this, realist works remain more pessimistic
about the ability of institutions to resolve conflicts
among states for two distinct but interrelated rea
sons. One, realists believe that states worry about
relative gains in cooperation—they worry not how
much they will gain absolutely, but how much they
will gain (or lose) vis-^-vis other states. Ihe distribu
tion of power comes into play here, because a state’s
concern with its position in that distribution is what
generates its concerns for relative gains. Second,
realist works note that only certain types of problems
can be solved through international institutions.
Even when states agree that no agreement is unde
sirable, they might disagree about which agreement
they prefer, given that different agreements have dif
ferent distributional consequences for states (Krasner, 1991). In these cases, the powerful states might
dictate which agreement is chosen. Overall, the real
ist approach focuses on the role of power in not only
shaping the rules of international institutions but
also in enforcing these rules. In this respect, realist
discussions of international economic institutions,
such as the IMF, the World Bank, or the World Trade
Organization, will tend to focus on how the economic
heavyweights dominate these institutions.
Liberalism. Liberal approaches to the study of the
world economy are currently more prevalent in
IPE than other theories/ffameworks. Core to the
liberal approach to understanding IPE is examining
the interrelationship between domestic politicaleconomic factors and international politicaleconomic factors (Frieden and Martin, 2003). The
variety of approaches to IPE that can be labeled as
focusing on the domestic-international interaction,
however, differ regarding their emphases on the
international versus the domestic factors in this
interaction.
The liberal literature has a number of identifiable
phases of evolution. First, these scholars have criti
cized realism for not taking into account adequately
economic interdependence (Keohane and Nye,
1977). This work has not only drawn attention to the
importance of economic relations among states, but
it has also aimed to move the debate on IPE from an

exclusive focus on state actors to one that also in
cludes international nonstate actors and interna
tional organizations. It has also taken aim at the
realist assumption of states as unitary actors by
pointing to interactions among agencies in different
states.
Second, liberal approaches have centralized the
role of international organizations in interstate in
teraction and emphasized how these institutions
facilitate interstate cooperation. This strand of the
literature is now generally labeled as neo-liberal in
stitutionalism. While power has not been absent
from neoliberal institutionalist analysis, it also has
not been central. The core aim of neoliberal institu
tionalism has been to explain the functions that in
stitutions serve to facilitate interstate cooperation
even in the face of declining hegemony (Keohane,
1984). In his seminal work, Keohane emphasized
that institutions allow states to pursue mutually
beneficial goals through, largely, the provision of in
formation and the reduction of transaction costs. For
instance, through their rules, institutions facilitate
reciprocity, enhance the monitoring of state actions,
and by providing stable platforms for interaction,
they allow repeated interstate interactions, thereby
bolstering the importance of state reputation. This is
not to suggest that liberal accounts are the only ones
to have taken cooperation seriously. As just dis
cussed, strands of realism have done so as well.
However, to put it in Krasner’s terms (1991), liberal
(institutionalist) accounts are more interested in fo
cusing on how institutions help states reach the
“Pareto frontier.” Pareto optimal outcomes are those
under which no party can be made better off with
out another party being made worse off.
Third, liberal approaches have focused on inte
grating the role of domestic politics into the analysis
of IPE. In early liberal work, this was done in a
number of ways, including tbe examination of the
domestic origins of foreign economic policy (e.g.,
Katzenstein, 1978) as well as through a focus on the
interrelationship between the domestic and the in
ternational levels. On the latter, Putnam’s (1988)
two-level games put forward an analytical model
that showed that the presence of international-level
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negotiations led to domestic policies that would
otherwise have not been pursued, while negotiators
also pushed for economic agreements on the inter
national level that would be acceptable to key con
stituencies on the domestic level.
In addition to expanding insights from these ear
lier studies, various aspects of the domestic-interna
tional interaction continue to be core to the liberal
agenda today. Under this rubric. Open Economic
Politics (OEP) is an increasingly common approach
(Lake, 2006). OEP borrows closely from international
economic theories to derive the interests of (groups)
of individuals that are beneficiaries versus losers
from globalization, with a view to later on seeing
how these interests are organized collectively and
how existing political institutions give expression (or
not) to them. For instance, the Eleckscher-Ohlin
(HO) theory of international trade holds that there
are three factors of production (land, labor, capital)
and in each country, one of these factors is most
abundant. A country exports goods produced with
its most abundant factor. For instance, China ex
ports goods that are labor intensive. In turn, exten
sions to HO hold that trade will benefit individuals
that are endowed with the factor with which their
economy is relatively more endowed (Hiscox, 2010).
Thus, we would expect the policy preference of la
borers in China to be pro-trade. How these policy
preferences get filtered through different national
institutions still demands analysis, and some liberal
works are more focused on the role of these institu
tions than on deriving the interests of different
groups. While authors who embrace OEP do not
deny the complexities involved (for instance, indi
viduals are not just participants in the labor market,
they are also consumers) and recognize that other
factors (such as feelings of nationalism) might play
into policy preferences, the crux of the theory rests
on individuals having a materialist orientation
toward international openness. This orientation
draws criticism from constructivists.
Constructivism. Constructivists disagree with the
liberal approach’s inference of (material) interests
from the position of actors in the national economy
(for instance, is the actor an exporter or an importer?).

as they believe that ideas (and other nonmaterial
factors, including norms and culture) constitute
interests. Different strands of constructivist research
offer different interpretations regarding how much
of the material world is contingent upon
interpretation—namely, the extent to which there
are objective facts as opposed to subjective under
standings. Regardless, the point for constructivists
is that “structures do not come with an instruction
sheet” (Blyth, 2003). Thus, agents’ ideas about who
they are, what they interpret their interests to be,
and how they imderstand their environment cannot
be left out of the analysis. Also, the notion of
intersubjective meanings, which are collectively
held understandings, is key to understanding social
interaction.
An example of these points comes from the 2008
financial crisis (Abdelal et al., 2010). First, as con
structivists point out, how policymakers defined the
roots of this financial crisis was intrinsically related
to ideas. For instance, defining the crisis as one of
lack of liquidity in financial markets leads to differ
ent policy outcomes than defining the crisis as one
of the failures of American-style capitalism. Second,
constructivists have suggested that more than ma
terial considerations had to be at play, because even
though the US was the epicenter of the crisis and
the US economy was widely judged to be overlever
aged, investors viewed US-denominated sovereign
debt as a safe haven. Thus, how agents interpret
their material environment, constructivists empha
size, is necessary to make sense of events here.
The constructivist agenda also has important im
plications for the study of international institutions.
First, constructivists analyze international organi
zations as being capable of acting as independent
agents. For instance, the staffs of these organiza
tions, such as the management of the IMF, push
their own ideas or norms, which then affect state be
havior. Second, constructivists analyze international
institutions as platforms for the “socialization” of
states. Put differently, while states may begin inter
acting with one another at institutions with a de
fined set of preferences, how they define their
preferences may change as they socialize with other
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states within institutions (e.g., Johnston, 2001). In
this regard, it is not only the staff of the international
organization as independent agents, but also the in
teraction with other states, that alters states’ per
ceptions of their interests. Third, states’ adherence
to international institutional rules cannot be
explained simply with reference to the pursuit of
state interests. Constructivists argue that beyond
the material reasons put forward by realists and lib
erals, states may have nonmaterial reasons for cre
ating institutions as well as abiding by them.
Institutions, they emphasize, also reflect the values
of international society.
Constructivist research often focuses on (groups
of) individuals with the ultimate aim of discussing
collective understanding or social change. For in
stance, as indicated above, constructivists empha
size the role of ideas. Since the originators and
disseminators of ideas, as well as their recipients,
are likely to be individuals, an analysis of these in
dividuals and how they transmit their ideas is im
portant in understanding changes in the social
environment. For example, the spread of Keynes
ian approaches to economic policy (on the national
or the international level) cannot be discussed
without also discussing the agents who positively
view Keynesian ideas. The behavior of these indi
viduals, then, goes on to explain the policies of
larger units, including international organizations
and governments.
This survey of the literature does not suggest that
all work is theoretically driven, nor does it suggest
that all aforementioned authors are self-identified
members of one of the three theoretical groups iden
tified. It does, however, imply that even in empiri
cally driven work, one of the analytical frameworks
discussed above is often consulted. For instance, an
author’s concern may be driven by the empirical
concern of understanding how the US allocates its
foreign aid. Here, it is possible that the author con
sults a combination of theories without being com
mitted to proving the supremacy of one over the
others. For instance, as is now known, US foreign-aid
patterns result from a number of diverse concerns,
including US geostrategic concerns, normative

concerns about poverty, and Congressional pol
itics of aid allocation. In other words, relying on a
number of different analytical frameworks may be
necessary in order to answer key empirical ques
tions. By the same token, in pursuit of these empiri
cal questions, authors may develop and refine
theory. For instance, the empirical finding provided
in the IPE literature that the US and other major
shareholders influence who gets loans from the
IMF provides a clear articulation of the influence of
power in international institutions. In sum, the the
oretical approaches are not straightjackets but tools
for systematic analysis.
Normative Implications of IPE Research. At the
onset, it was identified that some authors have
argued that American IPE neglects normative
questions. Regardless of whether this criticism is
justified, empirical research can offer normative
insights. For instance, different scholars have
emphasized how the US’s influence in multilateral
economic institutions, particularly the IMF and the
World Bank, has led to these institutions’ advocating
a specific model of economic development. This
model, known as the Washington Consensus
model of economic development, places an emphasis
on liberalization, deregulation, and privatization.
And, some scholars have argued that the Consensus
model of development does not have a good record
in promoting economic development, and that
it overlooks the complex ways in which economic
development is state led as opposed to market
driven. There is by no means a scholarly consensus
on this topic. Nonetheless, these findings are
important not just in terms of what international
organizations are doing; they also provide
instruments for assessing what these organizations
should be doing. In another example, the finding
that income inequality is rising in some states
facilitates not just empirical questions, such as the
relationship between rising inequality and global
forces, but also normative questions, such as
whether/why we should care about high levels of
inequality. Overall, then, there does not have to be
a big disconnect between the empirical and nor
mative realms of research.
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Into the Future? The 2008 financial crisis, which
started as a capital-markets panic that emanated
from the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the US in
September 2008 and rapidly became a global finan
cial crisis that ultimately put much of the developed
world in the worst economic downtown since the
worldwide depression of the 1930s, might impact IPE.
First, because the crisis’s roots are political in a
number of ways, scholars have begun to take stock of
how well the IPE literature did in predicting it
(Helleiner, 2011). Opinions here differ, but for those
who are convinced that IPE did a poor job of predict
ing the crisis, the kind of questions that the discipline
seeks to answer might be augmented going forward.
For instance, as some scholars have emphasized,
more analysis on how disparate findings (e.g., poorly
regulated financial markets, too-low interest rates
in the US, innovation in financial products, excess
savings in developing countries, and so on) connect
to one another might be necessary. Second, it is
plausible to expect (and there is already preliminary
evidence to this end) that IPE will engage in a ret
roactive analysis of the causes of the latest financial
crisis as well as governments’ reaction to dealing with
the crisis. For instance, some governments engaged
in fiscal stimuli (associated with Keynesianism, which
had been sidelined for a number of decades), which
raises questions about whether major policy changes
will occur. Third, to the extent that the crisis solidifies
long-term trends about the rise of emerging markets
(developing countries with high levels of economic
growth sustained over a period of time) and the
relative decline of advanced economies, it might
generate renewed interest in the distribution of
economic power in the global economic system, and
its effects on political structures. After all, before the
crisis, the notion that debt crises originate fi'om or
primarily affect developing economies, which was a
view that gained traction after the Asian Financial
Crisis of the 1990s, was the dominant viewpoint
(and concern) of large segments of academia and
international groups such as the IMF.
[See also Constructivism; International Relations;

Liberalism; and Realism.]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdelal, Rawi, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons, eds. Constructing the International Economy. (Ithaca, N.Y., 2010).
Blyth, Mark. “Structures Do Not Come with an Instruc
tion Sheet: Interests, Ideas and Progress in Political Sci
ence.” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 4 (2003): 695-703.
Cohen, Benjamin. International Political Economy: An
Intellectual History. (Princeton, N.J., 2008).
Drezner, Daniel. All Politics Is Global: Explaining Interna
tional Regulatory Regimes. Princeton, N.J., 2007).
Frieden, Jeffry, and Lisa Martin. “International Political
Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions.” In Po
litical Science: The State of the Discipline, edited by Ira
Katznelson and Helen V Milner. (New York, 2003).
Gilpin, Robert. U. S. Power and the Multinational Corpora
tion: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Invest
ment. (New York, 1975).
Helleiner, Eric. “Understanding the 2007-2008 Global
Financial Crisis: Lessons for Scholars of International
Political Economy?” Annual Review ofPolitical Science
14 (2011): 67-87.
Hiscox, Michael J. “The Domestic Sources of Foreign
Economic Policies.” In Global Political Economy. 3d
ed., edited byjohn Ravenhill, pp. 96-134. (Oxford, U.K.,
2oio).
Johnston, Alastair Iain. “Treating International Institu
tions as Social Environments.” International Studies
Quarterly no. 4 (2001): 487-515.
Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. Between Power and Plenty: For
eign Economic Policies ofAdvanced Industrial States.
(Madison, Wis., 1978).
Keohane, Robert After Hegemony. Cooperation and Dis
cord in the World Political Economy. (Princeton, N.J.,
1974).
Keohane, Robert, and Joseph Nye. Power and Interdepen
dence. (Boston, 1977).
Krasner, Stephen. “State Power and the Structure of In
ternational Trade.” World Politics 28, no. 3 (1976):
317-347.

Krasner, Stephen. “Life on the Pareto Frontier.” World
Politics 43, no. 3 (1991): 336-366.
Lake, David. “International Political Economy: A Matur
ing Interdiscipline.” The Oxford Handbook ofPolitical
Economy, edited by Barry R. Weingast and Donald
Wittman, pp. 757-777 (New York; 2006).
Maliniak, Daniel, and Michael J. Tierney. “The American
School of IPE.” Review of International Political Econ
omy 16, no. 1 (2009): 6-33.
Putnam, Robert. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organiza
tion 42 (1988): 427-460.
Ayse Kaya

